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HOW DID BRENTFORD EXPLOIT LIVERPOOL: LONG THROWS & DATA!
- Mik Van Well
- 1 day ago
- 6 min read
Before we dive into a micro-analysis of Brentford’s tactics against Liverpool, we need to explore their club-wide philosophy first. Now widely know; Brentford turned into a data-led football club when former statistician in the betting industry, Matthew Benham became controlling shareholder in 2012. He has turned the club into an organization where everyone is on the same page regarding long-term strategy. This has allowed them to recruit players and coaches within a long-term vision, rather than focussing on short-term results, tailored to one head coach or director of football. The recent internal promotion of Keith Andrews from set-piece coach to head coach after Thomas Frank’s departure fits into that narrative. At Brentford the coach doesn’t decide the tactical principles — their tactical principles decide who their next coach will be.
Those tactical principles have helped them beat Liverpool. Let’s dive into three elements of their game, all tailored by data, that focus on the same thing: maximizing created chances and minimizing conceded chances from the most dangerous zones. Where the ‘most dangerous zones’ are the first and second six-yard box — the second one refers to the zone between the six-yard box and penalty spot.
Long throws and full backs
Two minutes into the game we see the first appearance of one of Brentford’s weapons: set-pieces. More specifically, long throws. The home side won a throw-in on the left flank, around the edge of the penalty box, and it’s clear that everyone knows what to do next. There is an important role for both full backs in that plan. Although the throw-in is on the left flank, it’s right back Michael Kayode that travels across the pitch to throw the ball. The 21-year-old Italian can throw the ball extremely far, within a flat trajectory — similar to a corner kick. Their other full back, Kristoffer Ajer possesses a different quality. He is 196 cm tall (according to transfermarkt even 198)! The Norwegian veteran has already played 102 games for Brentford, of which most as a left centre back. But at left back he offers Keith Andrews a third tall aerial presence, besides the other two central defenders (Van den Berg and Collins) and striker Thiago. He is one of four players lining up at the front post trying to win the first contact.
The four Brentford players lost out to Virgil van Dijk (who else) with their first try. They got a second chance in the fifth minute of the game already however. Kayode launched it towards the front post again; this time Ajer won the first contact, heading the ball towards the middle of the six-yard box — the zone Brentford is always targeting from both set-pieces and open play.
Record signing Dango Ouattara was more alert than Milos Kerkez and finished the set-piece routine of. The Hungarian left back should have done more to make life difficult for Ouattara. He should at least try to physically feel his opponent to know where he is, even when looking at the ball.
Kayode ended the game with 2 chances created, only trailing his teammate Kevin Schade, whilst Ajer had more touches in the opposition box (5) than all Liverpool players, except Mohamed Salah. The impact of their long-throw strategy is even visible within their heatmaps (Kayode left, Ajer right):
You might be wondering if Brentford were lucky to win those two throw-ins close to the box, within five minutes. But of course they weren’t. Both situations came from the second tactical element: directness in possession.
Directness in possession
As mentioned before, Brentford aim to generate as many shots as possible from within the first or second six-yard box. Teams can prevent this by getting as many bodies inside their defensive box as possible, leaving more space to create chances from just outside the box, but minimizing the most dangerous space. Therefore, Andrews and his men (and all other Brentford teams from the past decade) try to get to the opponent’s box before they get the chance to drop into a structured low block. A team that tries to dominate within the opponent’s half, like Liverpool, are the perfect opposition for this strategy.
Brentford consistently tried to lure Liverpool towards their own goal with short combinations, before trying to exploit the space left behind the Reds’s press. For the first throw-in we can see below how many players Liverpool committed to their high press. Kelleher (GK) recognizes the situation and tries a long ball towards Damsgaard (CAM).
Liverpool’s right centre back, Konaté, wins this initial aerial duel but Brentford pick up the second ball. Both left back Ajer and rapid left winger Kevin Schade recognize the positional weakness of Liverpool’s defence at that moment. Ajer plays a through ball to his team mate, targeting the zone between Liverpool’s right back (Bradley) and Konaté, who is too high up the pitch to recover.
This requires Liverpool’s goalkeeper, Mamardashvili, to rush out of his goal — and concede a throw-in.
Two minutes later it’s the same strategy that led to the same result, this time Kelleher launches Schade directly:
It’s clear that Brentford were targeting the left wing position with Schade’s pace in possession. To no one’s surprise, their structure without the ball enhances that strength — and consequently their long throw strength as well.
Flexible structure without the ball
Liverpool copied their strategy of a narrow front four from their game against Frankfurt. Although Salah moved back into the right wing position and Wirtz back into the CAM position, with Isak benched, the idea was similar. Rather than providing width on the right flank, Salah positioned himself on the inside, like a right centre forward. Wirtz and Ektike occupied the half-spaces and Gakpo also played more central than usual. This led to the following average positions (source: Sofascore):
Brentford countered this front four, often joined by Bradley on the right flank, by a compact low block, in a 5-3-2.
Ouattara became the fifth defender, Schade formed a midfield-three with Yarmoliuk (later Janelt due to injury) and Henderson. These latter two were responsible for closing passing lanes to Ektike and Wirtz. Besides, as a veteran in midfield, Henderson was constantly coaching his team mates on their positioning and when to step out of the low block to force errors. In front of him Damsgaard and Thiago formed the first line of press, closing passing lanes to Liverpool’s double pivot, but also stepping up to their centre backs when needed/coached.
As Bradley was the more offensive fullback compared to Kerkez (at least in providing width and depth), why not let Schade join the back five instead of Ouattara? Because their defensive structure enhances their offensive strength — launching Schade in behind, between the full back and centre back. Having him positioned higher than Bradley allowed them to easily find him in that space.
The situation below highlights this strategy. Thiago intercepts the ball within the low block and plays a short pass to Damsgaard. Notice how Schade is already way ahead of Bradley and starts his run:
Damsgaard plays a perfect through-ball that eliminates Konaté from recovering and Schade stays composed 1v1 against Mamardashvili to give the home team a two goal lead.
Although Liverpool sometimes exposed the position of Schade by finding Bradley in his back, Brentford then simply shifted their back line towards the left, with Ajer picking up Bradley and leaving Salah to his centre backs. Liverpool could have caused issues for the Norwegian left back, by isolating him on the wing in 1v1 situations. As you might expect from such a tall player, Ajer doesn’t excel in agility and acceleration. Leaving him out wide against a quick and dynamic player like Salah or Wirtz could have created many mismatches inside the box, by dragging the defenders out of the low block. This dynamic is what allowed Liverpool to score the 2-1 quickly after Brentford’s second goal.
Wirtz and Salah moved wide, dragging both Ajer and Van den Berg out of the low block:
It’s then Bradley who utilizes the created space inside the box to find Kerkez (with a bit of luck) at the far post.
Brentford didn’t always drop into a low block however. During dead-ball situations — or following a Brentford attack with many committed players — when there is less chaos and a more controlled environment, they press their opponents far up the pitch, forcing turnovers or long balls. This is what precedes the penalty that is converted by Thiago in the 60th minute.
Both Janelt and Henderson are front-footed and alert and press Wirtz at the right moment to force a turnover:
Liverpool revived some tension in the 89th minute through a Salah goal. However, Brentford ‘professionally’ sealed the win (i.e., time-management).
[data: FotMob]
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