SPURS 0-1 CHELSEA TACTICAL BREAKDOWN

Sourabh Banerjee
21 hours ago
6 min read

The London derby in the EPL is always special for the fans. This game was also crucial for the points table situation. If Chelsea had won the match 2-0 against Spurs, they would have overtaken them in the standings. The match ended 1-0, thanks to Caicedo’s aggressive pressing and Pedro’s finish. In terms of xG, Chelsea limited Spurs’ chances to 0.10, with just one shot on target, which clearly highlights Maresca’s defensive plan. Chelsea created 3.68 xG against Spurs, showing that, at Tottenham’s stadium, Chelsea fully controlled the game.

Starting lineup for both teams

Chelsea started with a 4-2-3-1 formation, with Sanchez in goal. The four defenders were James, Fofana, Chalobah, and Cucurella. In midfield, Gusto and Caicedo played as the double pivots, while Enzo operated as the box-to-box midfielder. The two wingers were Garnacho and Neto, with Pedro as the lone striker. Key players like Palmer and Delep were missing due to suspension and injuries.

Spurs lined up in a 4-3-3. Their back four included Porro, Danso, Van de Ven, and Spence. Palhinha played in the holding role, supported by midfielders Sarr and Bentancur. The front three consisted of Kolo Muani, Kudus, and Bragvall. Due to a head injury, Bragvall substituted for Xavi Simons in the 5th minute. Both teams were affected by numerous injuries, with some players returning but only available on the bench, which influenced their starting line-ups.

(Chelsea and Spurs starting XI)

Limiting Spurs’ ball progression with man-to-man outside trigger

From the first minutes, Spurs used a 2-4-4 structure for ball progression in the middle third. Danso and Van de Ven formed the first defensive line. On the right flank, both Kudus and Porro applied the double-width principle, while on the left flank, Spence stayed wide in a wing-back role to maintain the width.

Chelsea, on the other hand, deployed a 4-1-4-1 formation that sometimes looked like a 5-4-1 in the middle third, holding an extra defender (+1) to strengthen their defensive shape. Caicedo marked Sarr tightly in Spurs’ right half-space, while Chelsea defenders Fofana and Chalobah covered the opposition’s lone striker, Kolo Muani.

(Limiting Spurs in the middle third used 4-4-1-1 with outside pressing at minute 1)

Chelsea’s pressing triggers effectively solved the midfield overload problem against Spurs. Spurs were unable to find their usual between-the-lines players, Bragvall or Simons. Neto’s higher starting position put pressure on Spurs’ centre-back Van de Ven, limiting Danso’s back-pass option. As a result, Pedro initiated the press intelligently, scanning and cutting off any diagonal passes to the spare man, while Arc pressed Danso from inside to outside, forcing Spurs into 1v1 situations with their nearby markers.

Even when Porro dropped into the first line to support and provide a new passing channel for Sarr and Kolo Muani, Spurs were still unable to create chances due to Chelsea’s tight marking and compact structure.

(Porro dropped into the first line during the build-up and tried to exploit the space in the channel, but due to Chelsea’s tight marking on the centre-backs and pivot, it was not possible to progress the ball effectively.)

Chelsea used the same pressing triggers to disrupt Spurs’ build-up play, and they were quite successful. In transition, they created several great opportunities, although they were unable to convert them into goals. One noticeable change, however, was their more man-oriented approach. Fofana closely marked Xavi Simons between the lines, while João Pedro allowed Spurs’ goalkeeper Vicario to make his initial pass to Danso before starting his arced pressing run. This movement forced Spurs into man-to-man situations, effectively limiting Danso’s passing options and restricting their build-up from the back.

(Same scenario against Spurs’ build-up from the back against 4-1-4-1)

Thomas Frank might use long kicks and focus on second-ball situations, utilising his brilliant structure to win those duels, just as he did with Brentford. He can also adjust his approach depending on the opponent’s pressing intensity, using this variation to avoid falling into pressing traps.

Chelsea's build-up approach against Spurs' high pressing

Chelsea also struggled in the first quarter of the game. They set up in a positional 3-2-2-3 structure, with Gusto pushing forward into the right half-space to help create a box midfield.

However, the main issue was a lack of width, which allowed Spurs to press more compactly in their 4-4-2 shape. Wide player Xavi Simons effectively shadowed the passing lanes to Gusto and applied pressure on Fofana from outside to inside. To help progress the ball, Enzo Fernández dropped between the left-back Cucurella and winger Garnacho, but due to Spurs’ man-oriented pressing, Chelsea still found it difficult to move the ball forward.

(Chelsea 3-2-2-3 against Spurs’ man-oriented 4-4-2)

(Fernández dropped between LB and LW to progress the ball, but Palhinha followed him, and Danso also marked Pedro tightly)

Chelsea found a solution this time as Reece James dropped between the two centre-backs, allowing them to dictate the tempo of the game. This adjustment created a 2v1 situation against Kolo Muani.

With Chelsea’s No. 8s positioned high in the half-spaces, Spurs’ centre-backs faced difficulties deciding when to step out, leading to frequent miscommunication between the defenders and midfielders. Chelsea shifted from 3-2-2-3 to 4-1-2-3; even their four-backs were narrow in the first-line build-up.

When João Pedro dropped between the lines, both Danso and Bentancur tried to mark him simultaneously, which left Gusto completely free in the half-space.

(Kolo Muani faced a 2v1 situation, and once James dropped into the first line of build-up, it also opened up passing lanes that were previously unavailable at 17 minutes)

In the final third, Chelsea focused most of their attacks down the right side, using Gusto’s overlapping and underlapping runs to create overloads.

Defensively, it was difficult for Spurs’ centre-backs to step out of the box and stop crosses, creating an interesting question about who should be responsible for covering the channel space, the area between the centre-backs and full-backs. Spurs used their two pivots to protect these channels, as Xavi Simons stayed high and Spence had to deal with Neto in 1v1 situations.

In this setup, Neto had two options: he could either pass to Gusto, making an overlapping run into the channel, or cut inside to switch the ball to the opposite flank for Garnacho. At times, he even attempted a back-post cross, where Chelsea created 2v1 situations. Because Enzo stayed high in the left half-space to maintain attacking depth, Porro hesitated to step out quickly, giving Garnacho enough time to cut inside and take a shot.

(Chelsea attacks in the final third on the left side with a combination of Neto and Gusto)

Counter against long throws

This year, long throws have increased significantly from the previous year. The average number of long throws (those travelling at least 20 metres into the opposition penalty area) has risen steeply to about 3.99 per match, a 162% increase from 1.52 per match in the 2024/25 season. This resurgence is across all teams, with every Premier League side attempting multiple long throws aimed into the box.

Chelsea conceded a goal last week against Sunderland, and with Thomas Frank’s reputation for maximising marginal gains through set pieces, free kicks, corners, and long throws, this presents an interesting challenge for Maresca to solve.

As the popular football saying goes, “Attack is the best defence,” and Maresca seems to embrace this idea by keeping three players high in the rest offence. However, during situations like long throws, which resemble corners in terms of aerial and physical duels, most of the tall and athletic players move into the box to attack, leaving fewer players behind to defend transitions.

In such moments, the structure of Chelsea turns into a 3v3 in rest defence. If the throw is cleared and play continues, it becomes a 9v10 open-play situation in favour of the defending (throwing against) team. Inside the box, it is typically an 8v6 scenario, again slightly favouring the defending team. If an opponent manages to pick up the loose ball or receive a layoff pass near the edge of the box, it becomes very difficult to defend, especially with no additional player left behind to challenge the spare man or cover depth in rest defence.

Conclusion

Thomas Frank will need to consider how to progress the ball through the central areas, where he can make better use of Xavi Simons. Spurs’ open-play xG has been relatively low in recent matches, so Frank may need to rethink their build-up phase, especially since Chelsea were able to nullify them effectively in that zone.

He might look to use more direct long balls or rely on Kudus’ physical strength to hold up play under pressure, functioning almost like a target man. However, Kudus will need proper support around him to make that approach effective.

For Chelsea, the key lies in finding consistency. They have performed well against stronger opponents but have struggled to maintain that same level of performance week in and week out.

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