DER KLASSIKER - CAN ANYONE STOP BAYERN MUNICH & HARRY KANE?

Heading into the clash against Borussia Dortmund, Bayern Munich had dominated and won every game so far this season — led by an incredible Harry Kane (21G+A in 10 games). Dortmund were ranked 2nd in the Bundesliga in terms of actual points and expected points. Both data and performance-wise they were the second best team in Germany. Although Der Klassiker was scheduled in game week 7, it could’ve already been title-deciding. If Bayern won this game, they would increase the gap to Dortmund to 7 points already, with no signal of slowing down soon. A win by Dortmund or a draw would at least keep hopes alive for anyone not classified as a Bayern Munich fan. However, Bayern did indeed not slow down and dominated the first half of this game. Rumours in the Belgian Media about a perfect season for Kompany and his men might be justified by the first 45 minutes.

Dortmund changed personnel in the second half though, and after a quick first chance, momentum flipped. In the end, Bayern won anyway (2-1), but Dortmund kept the game competitive until the final whistle — surprising after such a lopsided first half. Let’s explore how Bayern dominated the first 45 minutes and how Dortmund responded after half-time.

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Bayern’s dominance

Kompany’s tactics are characterized by strong dynamic positional play in possession and intense pressing without the ball. As usual they started in a 4-2-3-1 formation. This time with Kane as the attacking midfielder, behind Nicolas Jackson. However, in possession, Bayern create a back three, playing in a flexible 3-2-4-1 formation. Against Dortmund, Kimmich usually dropped deep, next to his centre backs to form that back three. Besides those three, Diaz and Olise also had fixed roles — so called anchors or pinners. They played high and wide, pinning the opposing wingback. The rest of the players had more fluid roles. However, Laimer mostly played in an inverted role, often forming a double pivot with Pavlovic. Boey also played as an inverted fullback, but in a more advanced position, occupying the right half-space. Jackson was constantly looking to make runs in behind or into wide zones, whilst Kane had a free role, roaming into half-spaces and deep into midfield. Against Dortmund’s 3-5-2, this led to the dynamics below.

I already mentioned the fluidity of their positional play a few times. And even ‘fixed’ players like Kimmich sometimes participated in chains of position changes. In the situation below for example, he moves back into his original position in front of the defence. Laimer advances forward and commands Pavlovic to create space for Kimmich and recreate the back three. Pavlovic then receives the ball and carries it up the pitch, which triggers Boey to drop deep and form a third version of the back three within one possession.

Kimmich low, Laimer and Pavlovic in a double pivot; Jackson dropped deep:

Kimmich advances into the double pivot, Laimer coaches Pavlovic to move into LCB to recreate the back three:

Laimer creates space, Pavlovic receives the ball and carries it forward; Boey tucks inside to form another back three:

The most fluid role within Kompany’s system is Harry Kane’s. With 11 goals in six Bundesliga games, you might expect a typical poacher - but Kane is all but a poacher. These expectations were justified by his opening goal against Dortmund; a header from a corner in the 22nd minute.

However, what impressed me most about his performance was his ability to dictate play from deep. The heatmap below perfectly illustrates his roaming. (Sofascore) This might be the weirdest heatmap ever for a number 9. His most active zone was where Tah’s average position was!

And he didn’t just drop deep to play short backwards passes. He ended this game with the third most accurate long balls (11), only trailing Schlotterbeck (13) and Kimmich (12). However, what makes it even more impressive is that he did it on 12 attempts; a 92% accuracy — Bundesliga average is 51.8%.

(FotMob) The images below show Kane’s playmaking skills, which - dare I say it - reminded me of Andrea Pirlo. Never thought I’d compare those two players.

Situation 1

Laimer starts in an inverted position in front of back three with Kimmich, Kane still high:

Laimer reverts back to a wide position, creating space for Kane to drop into. Süle doesn’t follow him:

Kane has complete freedom to utilize his incredible passing range:

Situation 2

Kane drops even deeper, and is under pressure at the edge of his own box:

With quick and agile footwork, Kane separates himself from his direct opponent and plays a progressive pass into space for Laimer to start a ‘counter-attack’ from a build-up situation — De Zerbi-esque.

Situation 3

Kane starts high, in front of the double pivot; three man build-up:

Laimer moves wide again, creating space for Kane to drop into; Anton and Süle both pointing, but neither stepping up. Sabitzer in between two opponents:

Kane again has complete freedom to play a long pass:

Let’s dive deeper into these pressing issues for Dortmund.

Pressing issues for Dortmund

Playing in a 3-5-2, rather than a 3-4-3 formation - a more defensive approach - Dortmund needed an extra player in their front line to press Bayern’s 3-man defence in build-up. Nmecha was that designated player, who was tasked with pressing Kimmich.

This left Sabitzer and Gross in midfield, against Pavlovic, Kane, and Laimer. Normally, teams will then commit to a man-to-man press, requiring a defender to step up to the open player. In a system with 3 or 5 defenders, the wingbacks are nicely suited for these roles (jumping up to a more advanced position/player). They used this dynamic on their left flank, where wingback Svensson jumped towards Boey and Schlotterbeck covered Olise. However, Dortmund didn’t want to commit their right wingback as well, because this would leave Luis Diaz in a 1v1 against a less mobile centre back — especially Süle, as Anton was usually pinned by Jackson. The only solution left was for Süle to follow Kane into midfield. This would not be ideal either, due to his uncomfortability high up the pitch, and Kovac rightfully decided against this.

The situation below shows these issues:

Adeyemi (right striker) and Nmecha (LCM) both step up to a centre back, whilst Guirassy is marking Kimmich. In their back, no defender steps into midfield — Ryerson is even running backwards towards Diaz. Consequently, Gross and Sabitzer find themselves in large spaces between multiple opponents (2v4).

When Laimer receives the ball and Dortmund’s midfielders move towards the ball, Bayern change play to the other flank to exploit the ‘open’ Boey and Pavlovic.

And again in injury time:

Nmecha and Svensson (LWB) both commit to the press, stepping up; Anton doesn’t want to leave his other defenders 1v1and doesn’t commit to the man-to-man press, leaving Gross in between Kane and the inverted Laimer.

After multiple successful long passes and unsuccessful presses, Süle decided to follow Kane during the situation below in the 37th minute.

The outcome? An accurate long ball by Kane to dismantle the press.

Given these difficulties created by Bayern’s quick and direct attackers, and Dortmund’s less mobile defenders, you might wonder why the visitors even bothered to press against one of the best in-possession teams in the world — if not the best.

Bensebaini came on for Süle at half-time and played as the most left central defender. Anton and Schlotterbeck both moved one spot to the right within their back-three. Although not a system change, Bensebaini changed Dortmund’s dynamics both in and out of possession, due his completely different play style. Süle is a traditional, heavy centre back. He is most comfortable defending deep inside his own half and using his strength to bully weaker attackers. Bensebaini on the other hand is originally an offensive left back — he used to score goals for fun at Gladback — who is very comfortable on the ball and more mobile out of possession. This improved profile, plus the fact that Süle was on a yellow card already made it an easy and successful decision for Kovac.

Besides, Gross moved into a more advanced position, in front of a double pivot of Sabitzer and Nmecha, creating a 3-4-1-2 formation.

These personnel changes in their defence allowed Dortmund to commit more bodies in their press, as the risk of leaving Süle 1v1 was mitigated. Ryerson could jump towards Laimer, leaving Anton against Diaz. This allowed Sabitzer to fully commit to covering passing lanes to Kane.

The incentive to step up as defenders became even bigger when Kompany subbed Jackson off for Goretzka and Kane moved back into the striker position. Goretzka played more static in midfield and Kane — despite all the well-deserved praise — is not a dangerous 1v1 player. This led to the set-up below, in which Schlotterbeck was comfortable following Kane, even when he dropped deep.

This improved out-of-possession structure plus a big chance in the 49th minute (Nmecha header) sparked Dortmund’s confidence to gain momentum. However, they didn’t convert that momentum into goals. In minute 78, Dortmund didn’t fully commit to a man-to-man press — Schlotterbeck didn’t follow Kane — leaving Nmecha in a 2v1. Another pin-point long ball led to the 2-0.

In the 84th minute, both teams made substitutions. Kovac brought on Brandt and Fabio Silva for Gross and Guirassy. Kompany subbed Boey off for defensive midfielder Bischof and moved Kimmich to right back.

30 seconds later, Bischof and Goretzka didn't communicate and both decided to ignore Brandt’s run (on fresh legs) into the box, and the attacking midfielder scored the 2-1.

Bayern survived the final 6 minutes plus injury time. Dortmund failed to create any more big chances.

Characterizing for Kompany’s mentality was the commitment to high pressing, even whilst defending a 2-1 lead in injury time:

Diaz, Kane, and Olise commit to the high press, which leaves Dortmund’s midfield unguarded; Goretzka recognizes this large gap between defensive lines and sprints forward intensely, forcing Nmecha back.

Schlotterbeck was then forced to play a long ball, which Bayern recovered with ease.

This led to yet another chance for Diaz, after (yet again) nice work by Kane and Olise.

Bayern’s victory and first half performance once again highlighted their tactical superiority and the incredible influence of Harry Kane, whose versatility makes them nearly unstoppable at the moment. If Kompany’s side maintains this level of fluidity and control, the question may no longer be who can stop Bayern, but if anyone truly can