PSV HUMILIATE CONTE’S NAPOLI (6-2) - HOW DID THE ITALIAN CHAMPIONS IMPLODE WITH DE BRUYNE?
- Mik Van Well 
- Oct 22
- 7 min read

Last night’s Champions League clash between PSV and Napoli featured two teams who lead their national league in possession: 61.2% and 63.1% respectively. Although Napoli’s implosion - spoiler alert for those who didn’t watch the game, Napoli lost 6-2 - happened during the second half, PSV already won the possession battle (with 55%) in the first half.
Another similarity between both teams is their coaches' preference for positional play and lining up midfielders. Against Napoli, Bosz started with Schouten (a defensive midfielder) at right centre back and Til (an attacking midfielder) as the striker. These decisions were made ‘easier’ because Dest (first-choice right back) was late - Flamingo moved from right centre back to right back - and Pepi (first-choice striker) is not 100% healthy yet.
Conte plays with an extra midfielder to incorporate Kevin de Bruyne into his league-winning team that already had a well-functioning midfield. The combination of Lobotka as a deep-lying playmaker, Anguissa as the engine, and McTominay as box-crasher worked wonders last year. The latter even won Player of the Year. How does De Bruyne fit into that structure? By moving McTominay to left winger and playing with an ‘extra’ midfielder.
Napoli in possession
Although he plays from a different starting position, last year's MVP is still arriving in the box from similar positions. Left back Spinazzola is tasked with providing width and depth on the left flank. On the right flank the synergy between full back and winger is opposite: Politano (RW) stays high and wide, whilst Di Lorenzo can invert into a double pivot, enhancing their midfield even further and providing defensive cover in the centre of the pitch. This leads to the following in possession structure:

The extra midfielder up front for PSV helped them counter Napoli in a low block. Rather than staying high up the pitch, Til was willing to drop next to Saibari and block passing lanes into midfield. Besides, the position change from natural centre back Flamingo (with experience in midfield) to right back meant he was comfortable following McTominay inside. Dennis Man (RW) was required to follow his opposing Spinazzola deep inside his own half. This led to situations like the one below:

PSV are defending in a low 6-4-0 block, with Veerman and Man joining the defensive line, and Til joining the midfield. Til intercepts De Bruyne’s pass and PSV can start a counter-attack.
Following an earlier set piece; Di Lorenzo is positioned as one of the attacking midfielders, Gilmour has occupied the zone where the right back usually plays, and De Bruyne has occupied the pivot (which Gilmour left). The latter two are no natural defenders and after losing the ball both aggressively press towards the ball carriers — first Gilmour to Perisic, then De Bruyne to Mauro Junior. They both leave their defensive zone, which Til exploits immediately.


He receives the ball in space before switching play to the right wing where Man plays a cross into the box. Saibari scored, but did so from an off-side position. Transition opportunities are visible for the home side however.
In the 38th minute a similar situation occurred. This time, PSV were even defending in a 7-3-0 block, with Mauro Junior as an extra defender as well. Perisic makes the interceptions and finds Til with a slide tackle-pass.

Saibari had already started his run and Til was able to send him through on goal with a simple pass. The Moroccan midfielder stays calm 1v1 with Milinkovic-Savic and gives PSV the lead within the first half.

The commitment of Til and Saibari to cover passing lanes into midfield, especially into Gilmour, allowed Mauro Junior to focus on one task: containing De Bruyne. He completed this task with success, ending the game with the most number of recoveries (outfield players). Moreover, De Bruyne ended the game with just 30 touches in 85 minutes played. Only Lucca (76 mins), Gasiorowski (46 mins), and Spinazzola (58 mins) had less. Besides, the limited touches he had were not as valuable as you might expect from him: 0 xA, 1 chance created, 1 pass into the final third, 0 accurate crosses, 0.03 xG, 0 shots on target.
Although their most creative player (and top scorer in Serie A) was contained for most of the game, Napoli were able to exploit their second quality: set pieces. They started this game with Lucca (2.01m!), McTominay (1.93m), Buongiorno (1.91m), and Beukema (1.88m). PSV on the other hand only had one player above 1.86m, Gasiorowski. He was even subbed off at half-time for Obisbo (1.84m) to bring the count to zero.
Unsurprisingly, Napoli’s only two goals were headers by McTominay following a set piece. The opening goal came from a cross after a short free kick. Their second goal (the 4-2) came directly from a corner kick.
Besides his strong defensive performance, Mauro Junior also had an impressive game on the ball. He assisted the 3-1 and ended the game with: 3rd most touches (60), 3rd most accurate passes (49), highest accuracy (98%), most xA (0.68), 0.28 xG.
Mauro Junior’s performance in possession was not De Bruyne’s fault necessarily. Where Mauro was constantly man-marking the Belgian midfielder, De Bruyne had a very different role out of possession.
PSV in possession
Conte relieves De Bruyne from much of his defensive duties to conserve the 34-year-old’s energy for his in-possession impact. He usually forms the first line of pressure with his striker, defending in a 4-4-2. Conte tries to force teams to play around the block through wide areas, before trapping them against the by-line. PSV didn’t fall for this trap however, and was able to exploit the space behind De Bruyne and Lucca through dynamic positioning.
They usually left the left half-space within their midfield unoccupied for a moment, before one of 6 players tried to get open inside that space. This led to the following in-possession structure:

The possession highlighted below from the first minute of the game illustrates those dynamics.
After a backwards pass from Schouten to Kovar, Lucca initiates the press by leaving the left centre back to move to the goalkeeper. If everyone else is covered and Lucca stays within the passing lane to Gasiorowski, this forces Kovar into a long ball.
However, Schouten moves into the open pivot (whilst Flamingo tucks inside as a third centre back) and creates a triangle with his goalkeeper and LCB. De Bruyne is a few meters behind him and can’t support Lucca, thus allowing PSV to easily evade the press.

A few seconds later, Schouten moves back into the RCB position and this time Til drops from his striker position into the open space.

When he doesn’t receive the ball, Til moves further up the pitch again. Now, Saibari drops and Salah-Eddine inverts into the open space — dragging Politano with him. This creates the space on the left flank for Veerman to receive.

Following a carry, Veerman now ends up in the pivot.

Although PSV is forced to play a long ball here, the manipulation of Napoli’s defensive structure is clear (above: Anguissa and De Bruyne both extremely high, leaving Gilmour isolated). This caused many issues for a team heavily reliant on closing central space.
Bosz’s manipulation of space is even more visible after goal kicks. In the situation below, 8 of PSV’s players are within Napoli’s half — leaving Kovar, Schouten, and Gasiorowski in a 3v2 against De Bruyne and Lucca.

Again, Lucca initiates the press. But when Gasiorowski moves into the wide open space in front of him, there is no one else to cover him. The Spanish CB wasn’t even included in the six players that could occupy the left half-space in the earlier visualization.
As long as Kovar stays calm and Gasiorowski makes the right movement, this is a risk-free build-up strategy. PSV execute this perfectly here:

In the final third, PSV was able to exploit the defensive inefficiencies caused by De Bruyne’s lack of defensive involvement and the manipulation of space by PSV. Besides, it was interesting to see how a team coached by Conte allowed so much open space in the centre of the pitch during transition.
Preceding the 3-1 by Man, both De Bruyne and Spinazzola are high up the pitch, out of position, and unable to recover in transition into their defensive structure. Anguissa is required to step out to Man on the flank. Both of Napoli’s centre backs and their right back are occupied by Til and Saibari. Besides, Perisic has inverted, whilst Politano is still out wide — this leaves Gilmour in a 1v3 in midfield.

As this possession progresses, Salah-Eddine joins PSV’s midfield, whilst Politano is still defending no-one out wide. Gilmour is now isolated within a box midfield (1v4)! Veerman exploits this numerical advantage and finds Mauro Junior in between the lines, able to turn into the box.

Mauro stays calm and assists Man with a cut-back.

After this goal, Conte makes a triple substitution; moving De Bruyne into the pivot. PSV is able to exploit the space between the lines even more after this change.
In minute 76, Lucca receives an intriguing red card for arguing with the referee and De Bruyne is moved into a thankless lone striker position. Nine minutes later he is relieved from this duty and replaced by Elmas.
PSV then finished this game with two beautiful team goals and a touch of class by Joey Veerman. They played 46 passes in the build-up, preceding the 4-1 by Man — the most ever since Opta started tracking in the UEFA Champions League (OptaJohan on X).
Before they sealed their victory with a perfect team-goal, Veerman sent Driouech and Pepi through on goal with the De Bruyne-esque pass below:


The two PSV subs didn’t squander this chance and delivered the 5-2, one minute after McTominay’s second goal — which might have brought some hope back for Napoli fans.
Veerman assisted the 4-1, and had the pre-assist for the 3-1 and 5-2. Besides, he ended the game with the most: touches, accurate passes, chances created, passes into final third, accurate crosses, and accurate long balls (excluding goalkeepers). Despite all this creativity he had a 93% pass accuracy, which was even skewed by two overly-opportunistic passes in garbage time — a basketball term for the final minutes of a game that’s already decided. Class.
[data: FotMob]
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